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The Beginning Before The Beginning: 
hegel and The acTivaTion of PhilosoPhy
Paul ashton
AbstrAct: This paper suggests that it is not enough to simply account for the ‘beginning’ in 
hegel’s philosophy. To capture the speculative depth of hegel’s thinking one must also account 
for the beginning of philosophy as such. That is, how or why the philosopher begins or ‘the 
beginning before the beginning’. The question of the activation of the philosophical project itself 
is explored through hegel’s notion of the ‘need of philosophy’ and the fundamental relation 
between the historical event of the french revolution and philosophical thinking. This question 
is explored through a critical discussion of those thinkers who are also concerned with the 
philosophy/revolution relation but are critical of hegel’s approach. it is suggested that these 
critical readings employ a thematic approach to both hegel and philosophy more generally. 
This approach renders them unable to appreciate hegel’s philosophy speculatively and as a 
consequence the relation between philosophy and freedom, via the revolution, is misconstrued. 
in contradistinction to these readings the question of how one encounters hegel’s thought non-
thematically is explored through an analysis of the willingness of the would-be philosopher to 
activate themselves into the philosophical project and dwell with hegel in the ‘we’. rather than 
providing answers to the questions raised, this paper seeks to act as a provocation for a renewed 
encounter with hegel’s philosophy. 
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inTroducTion
The one thing that almost all readers of hegel agree upon is that for hegel the 
question of a properly philosophical beginning, or ‘with what must science begin’, is of 
central importance to the activation of his philosophy. The problem of the beginning 
in hegel’s philosophy is multifarious, there is the beginning of the logic, or the system 
as a whole, there are new beginnings in each developmental cycle of the system—logic, 
nature and spirit—and there is the beginning of the Phenomenology of  Spirit.1 While not 
as universally agreed upon, the need for the ‘beginning’ to be presuppositionless is now 
generally also accepted. however, what has received less attention is the beginning of 
philosophy as such; how or why the philosopher begins—the beginning before the beginning.2
     1. g. W. f. hegel, The Phenomenology of  Spirit, trans. a.v. Miller, new york, oxford, 1977, (henceforth 
Ps).
     2. i would like to express my sincere gratitude and appreciation to my friends and colleagues Toula ni-
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With hegel, commentators generally agree that philosophy cannot ‘presuppose its 
ob-jects as given immediately by representation’ (el § 1)3 and consequently it ‘cannot 
presuppose the method of cognition […] with regard to its beginning and advance’ (el § 1). 
appropriately, given this fundamental starting position, recent commentators have once 
again begun to recognize the importance of hegel’s systemic texts and in particular the 
Science of  Logic.4 This non-negotiable starting position for philosophy can possibly help 
us explain the dual tendency within the scholarship on hegel’s work. on the one hand 
many commentators take a thematic approach, focusing on any number of insights to 
be found in hegel—usually from his political philosophy—while avoiding the implica-
tions of the speculative logic altogether.5 on the other hand we find those who try to 
work through the texts systematically in compliance with hegel’s directive to be presup-
positionless. The sheer impenetrability of the hegelian texts ensures that even the most 
systematic among the commentaries face unexplainable aporias. however, what is per-
haps more revealing are the silences common to both tendencies. on closer inspection 
of the aspects of hegel’s philosophy upon which the commentaries remain silent, or at 
least rather laconic, we can find a paradoxical unity. as most readers of hegel scholar-
ship will have experienced, it is often in the same key areas that the commentaries be-
come silent or vague, regardless of one’s perspective. symptomatic of this are the para-
digmatic examples of ‘the role the absolute’ and ‘absolute knowledge’; a consequence of 
which is that in the two-hundred years since its publication there is no general consensus 
or ‘accepted’ reading of the Phenomenology or for that matter of the System. 
however, i want to suggest that the silences found within these two tendencies stem 
from their continued failure to address the central question of what it means to en-
counter philosophy as such and hegel as a philosopher; an omission that interrupts our 
ability to address the question of the activation of the philosophical project itself or the 
beginning before the beginning. To this extent, i will attempt to explore the conditions 
that prepare the ground for a more complete engagement or encounter with hegel as 
a ‘kindred spirit’. 
Possibly the reason that the beginning before the beginning has not become an is-
sue in the literature is that scholars have wisely heeded hegel’s warnings to not be like 
scholasticus who tried ‘to learn to swim before he ventured into the water’ (el § 10 r). hegel 
argues that ‘to want the nature of cognition clarified prior to science is to demand that it 
colacopoulos, claire rafferty and george vassilacopoulos for their valuable discussion and suggestions 
regarding this paper.
     3. g. W. f. hegel, The Encyclopaedia Logic (1830), with the Zusätze: Part I of  the Encyclopaedia of  Philosophical 
Sciences with the Zusätze, trans. Theodore f. geraets, W. a. suchting and h. s. harris, indianapolis, hackett, 
1991, (henceforth el).
     4. see three recent commentaries on the logic: John W. Burbidge, Hegel’s Systematic Contingency, hound-
mills, Palgrave Macmillan, 2007, david gray carlson, A Commentary to Hegel’s Science of  Logic, new york, 
Palgrave Macmillian, 2007, stephen houlgate, The Opening of  Hegel’s Logic: From Being to Infinity, indiana, 
Purdue university Press, 2006. g. W. f. hegel, Science of  Logic, trans. a.v. Miller, new Jersey, humanities 
Press, 1997, (henceforth sl).
     5. There are numerous examples of this tendency but perhaps the most cited example is allen W. Wood, 
Hegel’s Ethical Thought, cambridge, cambridge university Press, 1990.
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be considered outside the science; outside the science this cannot be accomplished, at least 
not in a scientific manner and such a manner is alone here in place’ (sl 68). There is no 
doubt that hegel is rejecting a kind of meta-philosophical perspective, that there exists 
some space outside of, or for that matter within, philosophy from which to clarify what 
philosophy is. This does not mean that philosophy cannot consider its own cognitive 
process, its own movement, but rather it cannot philosophically take account of its own 
movement prior to, or separate from, the very movement itself. Perhaps an extreme 
version of this thesis is hegel’s claim in the introduction to the Phenomenology that the 
absolute is ‘with us, in and for itself, all along’ (Ps ¶ 73), for if it were not we would find 
ourselves trying to cognize something foreign or external to our thinking. if we accept 
hegel’s understanding that science cannot take place outside of science, where and 
how would such a consideration take place? 
an obvious place to look for such a discussion is in hegel’s prefaces and introduc-
tions, a part of his work that is not part of the science itself. What the prefaces and the 
pre-systemic texts offer us is not a Science of the beginning before the beginning—hence 
the superfluousness of prefaces to Science—but a series of reflections on philosophy and 
its conditions of activation that are not themselves the point of activation. There is no 
doubt that we have a problem here with regard to the beginning; either something is al-
ready scientific and thus not in need of a beginning or it is not, and from this perspective 
the question of how one would even recognize science if they came across it becomes 
relevant. however, these texts at best only gesture to such a source of activation in a 
way that only makes sense to those already activated into philosophy and do not give an 
explicit account of such an activation. Thus even if we accept hegel’s claim that the ab-
solute is there with us from the beginning, we would have to account for how and why 
we come to recognize what is already there? 
Interests and Wants: How do We Begin?
The need to introduce the thinker to the scientific standpoint and the coextensive 
paradox of the supposed impossibility of a completely presuppositionless beginning has 
been a significant problem for readers of hegel’s system. This has led some commen-
tators, including William Maker, to treat the Phenomenology as not properly scientific 
in itself, and thus not in need of a presuppositionless beginning, in an attempt to en-
sure a genuinely scientific beginning for the Logic (considered as speculative philosophy 
proper). To this extent, the Phenomenology is seen as merely a ‘presupposition for pre-
suppositionless science’,6 the fundamental purpose of which is the elimination of the 
dichotomous perspective of consciousness. More recently stephen houlgate has taken 
a version of this thesis even further in suggesting that the Phenomenology is in fact not a 
necessary part of hegel’s philosophy, arguing that: ‘the Phenomenology does not provide 
the only possible route into speculative philosophy. Those who are prepared to suspend 
     6. William Maker, Philosophy Without Foundations: Rethinking Hegel, albany, state university of new york 
Press, 1994, p. 85.
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their ordinary certainties can bypass the Phenomenology and proceed directly to the Logic’.7 
Thus for houlgate the requirement here is that one take on or possess the appropriate 
attitude to begin presuppositionless philosophy qua speculative logic—that is, beyond the 
dichotomous perspective of consciousness. furthermore, it is important that members 
of the would-be ‘we’ are ‘persuaded to give up their “presuppositions and prejudices”’, 
a persuasion that could take place through ‘studying the history of modern philosophy’ 
or even through the engagement with ‘true religion’.8 This rather strong claim suggests 
that the justificatory role of the Phenomenology is both contingent and instrumental.9 from 
this position, what places one on the path that activates their philosophical drive so 
to speak, that annihilates presuppositions, is taken as given. ignoring the activation of 
philosophy is no insignificant omission, for why would one without considerable cause 
seek to rid oneself of the dichotomous perspective of consciousness if, as hegel informs 
us, doing so will lead them onto a path of despair (Ps ¶ 78) and mean they must suffer 
the ‘violence’ of this ‘inverted posture’ (Ps ¶ 26)? of course on one level we can account 
for the activation of thinking through a rather mundane or commonsensical ‘external’ 
encounter with ideas and institutions in everyday life, but what this ultimately has to 
do with our encounter with philosophy as such is possibly limited or else at least requires 
some explaining. for that matter, who is this ‘we’ that has read hegel’s philosophy, who 
has been walking on its head down the violent highway of despair for two-hundred 
years now?
if we try to make sense of how these different readings take place and what moti-
vates them—or for that matter what motivates hegel in his comments regarding the 
beginning and activation of philosophy—we are struck by the perceptiveness of Kenley 
royce dove’s recognition that the ‘interpretation of the “we” tends to govern […] one’s 
view of the Phenomenology as a whole’.10 however, as dove also recognizes, despite the fact 
     7. houlgate, The Opening of  Hegel’s Logic, p. 146.
     8. houlgate, The Opening of  Hegel’s Logic, p. 146.
     9. houlgate carefully defends this argument by drawing on hegel’s claim that ‘nothing is needed to be-
gin doing speculative philosophy except “the resolve (Entschluß), which can be regarded as arbitrary, that 
we propose to consider thought as such” (sl 68). such a resolve requires that one “rid oneself of all other 
reflections and opinions whatever”, and simply “take up what is there before us”—namely, the sheer being 
of thought, or thought as sheer being (sl 68)’. also instructive here is el § 78. on this see houlgate, The 
Opening of  Hegel’s Logic, p. 145.
     10. Kenley r. dove, ‘hegel’s Phenomenological Method’, The Review of  Metaphysics, vol. 23, no. 4, 1970, pp. 
615-41, p. 631. The fact that the ‘we’ plays this governing role is not surprising if we analyse the text. hegel 
uses ‘we’ and its variants ‘for us’ and ‘us’ (‘wir’, ‘unser’ and ‘für uns’) over 180 times throughout every chapter 
of the Phenomenology. for a detailed account of each of these uses and a comprehensive study of the ‘we’ in 
hegel see david M. Parry, Hegel’s Phenomenology of  the “We”, new york, P. lang, 1988. however, in reading 
the ‘we’ strictly in terms of a project of philosophy already taken up, or as already activated, Perry interprets 
the ‘we’ simply as the ‘reader’ of the Phenomenology and does not account for what i am suggesting is hegel’s 
concern in the first place; the activation of philosophy and the ‘we’ as the dwelling space of the activated 
philosopher. however, Perry does recognize that there is a need to ‘prepare’ the ‘reader’ for the work and 
this activity must itself be done prior to philosophy understood as science. This is done through the ‘Pref-
ace’ which is an ‘ironic’ gesture that functions in terms of what he describes as ‘the liar’s paradox’. somehow 
by being ironic about the status of a preface a would-be thinker can engage with the preconditions in such 
a way that it does not undermine the phenomenological process as such. however, this strategy is far from 
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that nearly all commentators ‘recognize’ the ‘need of an explanation’ for the ‘we’, and do 
in fact offer some explanation, the ‘explanations usually provided, are […] remarkably 
laconic’.11 laconicism is not usually a word one would associate with hegel scholarship 
on the Phenomenology more generally. for example, one would be reticent to describe 
hyppolite’s Genesis and Structure12 at 608 pages, harris’ Hegel’s Ladder13 at 1567 pages and 
Pinkard’s Hegel’s Phenomenology14 at 451 pages, as laconic; yet perhaps with the excep-
tion of hyppolite—who does try to deal with the ‘we’, even if it does remain largely 
suggestive—dove’s point is correct in that little is said or made explicit with regard to the 
role of the ‘we’.
accordingly, commentators who read the Phenomenology and its beginning in the 
manner outlined above, such as houlgate, tend to see the ‘we [as simply] the readers 
and phenomenologists’15 who take up the task of working through the eradication of the 
dichotomous perspective of consciousness. Thus the ‘readers of the Phenomenology are 
intended to be ordinary people (and philosophers tied to ordinary beliefs) who are un-
moved by the modern spirit of philosophical self-criticism and so need to be persuaded 
that hegel’s presuppositionless, ontological logic is a justified and relevant science’.16 
accordingly people such as this are typically ‘firmly immersed in the world of everyday 
experience’, but if they are to be elevated to the standpoint of science ‘they cannot be 
bull-headed [and] they must have some interest in what hegelian speculative philoso-
phy might disclose about the world and be open to what it may show them about their 
own everyday beliefs’.17 What prepares the would-be reader of the Phenomenology is an 
‘openness of mind [that] may come from a basic ethical decency and intelligence, or 
indeed, it may stem from religion.’18 Thus it is the ‘openness of mind’ of the conscious-
ness of the would-be philosopher that permits and therefore ‘anticipates the perspective 
of absolute knowing’.19 But it could be argued that this way of thinking about the char-
acter of the ‘we’ and the anticipation of the perspective of absolute knowledge raises 
other questions. for example: what would it mean to have an ‘interest’ in the disclosure 
of the world, where would such an interest come from and how would one’s mind be 
opened?
if we accept the value of dove’s insight that the ‘we’ plays a structuring role in the 
convincing and opens up more problems for the would-be philosopher than it solves. for example, an ironic 
attitude to the text already assumes a level of philosophical engagement.
     11. dove, ‘hegel’s Phenomenological Method’, p. 629.
     12. Jean hyppolite, Genesis and Structure of  Hegel’s Phenomenology of  Spirit, trans. samuel cherniak and John 
heckman, evanston, northwestern university Press, 1974.
     13. h. s. harris, Hegel’s Ladder, 2 vols., indianapolis, hackett, 1997.
     14. Terry P. Pinkard, Hegel’s Phenomenology: The Sociality of  Reason, new york, cambridge university Press, 
1996.
     15. This statement of houlgate’s could be found in literally dozens of books on hegel. see stephen houl-
gate, An Introduction to Hegel’s Philosophy: Freedom, Truth and History, 2nd ed., oxford, Blackwell, 2005, p. 57.
     16. houlgate, The Opening of  Hegel’s Logic, p. 160.
     17. houlgate, The Opening of  Hegel’s Logic, p. 160.
     18. houlgate, The Opening of  Hegel’s Logic, p. 160.
     19. houlgate, The Opening of  Hegel’s Logic, p. 160.
Paul ashTon 333
reading of the Phenomenology then an interesting comparison with houlgate’s interpreta-
tion is that offered by h. s. harris. While houlgate and harris present substantially dif-
ferent readings of the Phenomenology—for example, the idea that the Phenomenology could 
be replaced with the study of history or religion is unthinkable for harris, as the Phenom-
enology is most definitely ‘a science in its own right’20—they nonetheless maintain similar 
positions on the ‘we’. like houlgate, harris presents the commonsensical view that the 
‘we’ is the ‘ordinary consciousness of the present world that wants to comprehend the 
world of experience philosophically’.21 however, harris does acknowledge that this is 
not just anyone, not just ‘educated’ people, rather it is the ‘educated consciousness of the 
present that wants to be comprehensive’.22 We can see here that harris is trying to account 
for the intersubjectivity of the ‘we’ and the everydayness of the would-be philosopher, 
however, we can also see that harris’ position leaves questions unanswered. how or 
why does the ‘we’, qua ‘educated consciousness of the present that wants to be comprehensive’, 
come to take up philosophy in this form? in associating this desire ‘to be comprehensive’ 
with ‘the natural “desire to know”’, as harris does, the contingency and situatedness 
of the actualization of the philosophical outlook is missed. similarly, certain problems 
arise with the use of language like ‘the natural “desire to know”’; for example how does 
one take account for hegel’s insistence that ‘[f]reedom of Thought [constitutes …] a 
first condition’ (lhP i 94)23 of philosophy and that ‘[t]hought must be for-itself, must 
come into existence in its freedom, liberate itself from nature and come out of its im-
mersion in mere sense-perception; it must as free, enter within itself and thus arrive 
at the consciousness of freedom’ (lhP i 94)? in responding to a range of ‘ontological’ 
readings of the ‘we’ harris—and again he is typical of the dominant readings—makes 
the point that the whole problem of the ‘we’ is a ‘pseudo problem, which exists only 
for those who [… believe that an] unnatural way of talking is the proper expression of 
a philosophical consciousness’.24 harris continues that ‘hegel obviously means “us” to 
include anyone who wants to share the knowing that will be shown to be “absolute” in 
the book’ the only prerequisite to be one of ‘us’ is ‘that you must already have the sort 
of knowledge that he himself [hegel] was endowed with during his own Bildung’.25 That 
is, to ‘be a possible member of the “We” one must know the history of our religious and 
philosophical culture’.26 
But if harris is critical of those who needlessly ontologize the ‘we’ then he is equally 
in danger himself of epistemologizing it. There is no doubt that ‘absolute knowledge’, 
the achieved cognitive perspective of the ‘we’, is a knowing and therefore an epistemic 
stance, but it is equally ontological in that it is a way of  knowing that takes account of the 
     20. h. s. harris, Hegel’s Ladder, vol. 1, 2 vols., indianapolis, hackett, 1997, p. 110.
     21. harris, Hegel’s Ladder, p. 178.
     22. harris, Hegel’s Ladder, p. 178.
     23. g. W. f. hegel, Lectures on the History of  Philosophy, trans. e. s. haldane and frances h. simson, vol. i 
greek Philosophy to Plato, 3 vols., lincoln, university of nebraska Press, 1995, (henceforth lhP i).
     24. harris, Hegel’s Ladder, p. 201 n. 30.
     25. harris, Hegel’s Ladder, p. 201 n. 30.
     26. harris, Hegel’s Ladder, p. 178.
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essential unity of knowing and known, subject and object—that is, a stance taken within 
the space of the knowing/being mutual informing. Both harris and houlgate seem to 
be suggesting that the would-be philosopher’s place in the ‘we’ is determined by their 
level of knowledge or intellect and that only when they have reached these heights of 
thinking—the height of hegel!—are they capable of becoming a member of the ‘we’ 
and beginning the philosophical process. however, both thinkers already acknowledge 
the limitation of this view when they point to the would-be philosopher as having ‘inter-
est’ and ‘wants’. What their use of the terms ‘interest’ and ‘want’ suggests is that these 
two thinkers already indicate a position beyond the epistemic stance of the philosopher 
as merely someone who knows, to something ontologically more fundamental: that ‘we’ 
have the interest and want to disclose the world, presumably not in a dichotomous sense 
but speculatively. That is, harris and houlgate already point in the direction of where 
philosophy comes from and how it is activated before its activation; to a want that is a 
need.
The need of PhilosoPhy
if we are to address the question of how and where the ‘we’ that has ‘wants’ and 
‘interests’ arises, and is constituted, then the question of the need of  philosophy also arises. 
in the introductory chapter to the Difference27 essay, the ‘various forms occurring in 
contemporary Philosophy’ (d 85-118), hegel explicitly addresses the question of ‘the 
need of philosophy’. it has been recognized by many commentators, including the trans-
lator h. s. harris, that this need can be understood as a dual need: ‘the need (at this 
time) for philosophy, and what philosophy needs (at this time)’.28 however, what both of 
these interpretations possibly miss is the explicit meaning of the phrase; by saying ‘the 
need of philosophy’ hegel is drawing attention to the need of philosophy (as such), that 
is, philosophy’s own need. With this meaning we can also add ‘at this time’, as although 
philosophy’s need has an eternal dimension, it is nonetheless always situated historically. 
Thus we can say that what we are dealing with is philosophy’s own need at this time. 
But why is the question of philosophy’s own need at this time important for us and what 
do we mean by ‘this time’ and why is ‘this time’ important in terms of this need? hegel 
understands his philosophy as taking place in the space opened up by the rise of mo-
dernity, but more specifically hegel understands his time, and consequently his thought 
qua of ‘this time’, to be the thought of revolution.29 Thus despite the ambiguous status of 
the ‘future’ in hegel’s philosophy, we can see that just as the revolution through its prac-
     27. g. W. f. hegel, The Difference Between Fichte’s and Schelling’s System of  Philosophy, trans. h. s. harris and 
Walter cerf, albany, state university of new york Press, 1977, (henceforth d).
     28. harris in hegel, The Difference Between Fichte’s and Schelling’s System of  Philosophy, p. 89 n. 7. The second 
sense of ‘need’ is not to be confused with what i suggest below because ‘need’ in this usage is understood as 
what philosophy needs in order to be a more satisfactory as a discourse.
     29. see Joachim ritter: ‘there is no other philosophy that is a philosophy of revolution to such a degree 
and so profoundly, in its innermost drive, as that of hegel’, Joachim ritter, Hegel and the French Revolution: 
Essays on the Philosophy of  Right, cambridge, MiT Press, 1982, p. 43.
Paul ashTon 335
tice announces the future, philosophy through its thinking gives conceptual form to the 
future. That is, hegel’s philosophy gives conceptual form to a future already announced 
through the event of the french revolution.30 read in this way we can see that philoso-
phy comes after the political, giving form to that which has been announced in practice, 
and that the want and interest of the philosopher, who wants to disclose the world, 
comes from an announcement that has already taken place. This is why according to 
hegel philosophy always ‘comes too late’ (Pr 23).31 
however, as indicated above, the claim that for hegel philosophy through its think-
ing gives conceptual form to the future cannot be made so easily: from the earliest com-
mentaries the received view has been that hegel’s system has no place for the future. 
for example, the youngest of the young hegelians august cieszkowski in his 1838 work 
Prolegomena zur Historiosophie32 argued that hegel’s philosophy is essentially contemplative 
and backward looking and does not take account of the future. furthermore this early 
reading, via Marx’s eleventh thesis, has been decisive in establishing boundaries for 
subsequent scholarship on the topic. in its extreme form this reading posits hegel as a 
reactionary apologist for the Prussian state, and while this latter view has been demol-
ished in the secondary literature33 to the extent that no serious thinker accepts this idea 
today, the same cannot be said for the widely accepted view that hegel’s system has 
no place for the future. While there have been some attempts more recently to revive 
the concept of the future in hegel34 their impact has been limited. There is of course 
very good reason for the acceptance of the received view; hegel repeatedly claims that 
philosophy arrives on the scene too late, that it ought not issue instructions for future 
ages and that one is always a thinker of his or her own age. There is no doubt that for 
hegel hypothetical speculation on events to come is not and can not be considered 
philosophical—philosophy is always reflection on what is and never on what ought to 
be. This of course raises important questions regarding the role of the philosopher and 
their relation to world in the thinking of freedom and specifically whether we would-be 
     30. habermas attributes to hegel’s epochal understanding the idea that ‘the secular concept of modernity 
expresses the conviction that the future has already begun’, see Jürgen habermas, The Philosophical Discourse 
of  Modernity: Twelve Lectures, trans. frederick g. lawrence, cambridge, MiT Press, 1996, p. 5.
     31. g. W. f. hegel, Elements of  the Philosophy of  Right, allen Wood (ed.), trans. h. B. nisbet, cambridge, 
cambridge university Press, 1996, (henceforth Pr).
     32. see august von count cieszkowski, Prolegomena zur Historiosophie, Berlin, veit, 1838. sections of this 
text are translated in august cieszkowski, Selected writings of  August Cieszkowski, ed. and trans. andre liebich, 
cambridge, cambridge university Press, 1979, august cieszkowski, ‘Prolegomena to historiosophie’, The 
Young Hegelians: An Anthology, ed. and trans. lawrence s. stepelevich, cambridge, cambridge university 
Press, 1983, pp. 53-90.
     33. see for example chapters 4-8 of Jon stewart (ed.), The Hegel Myths and Legends, evanston, northwestern 
university Press, 1996. in particular see T. M. Knox, ‘hegel and Prussianism’, in Jon stewart (ed.), The Hegel 
Myths and Legends, evanston, northwestern university Press, 1996, pp. 70-81.
     34. Most notable here is catherine Malabou, The Future of  Hegel: Plasticity, Temporality, and Dialectic, trans. 
lisabeth during, new york, routledge, 2004. however, this work, as with many others that try to resurrect 
the notion of the future in hegel discuss the future in terms of time and specifically in terms of heidegger’s 
encounter with hegel’s notion of time. While this focus on temporality is reasonable enough it does prevent 
the possibility of what i am suggesting here that in some sense the future is already with us.
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speculative philosophers need philosophy or whether philosophy needs us? 
The Announcement of  the Modern Age
hegel gives a rather poetic account of the birth of this modern age, the age of revo-
lution, in the preface to his Phenomenology:
it is not difficult to see that ours is a birth-time and a period of transition to a new 
era. spirit has broken with the world it has hitherto inhabited and imagined, and is 
of a mind to submerge it into the past, and in the labour of its own transformation 
… The frivolity and boredom which unsettled the established order, the vague 
foreboding of something unknown, these are the heralds of approaching change. 
The gradual crumbling that left unaltered the face of the whole is cut short by a 
sunburst which, in one flash, illuminates the features of the new world (Ps ¶ 11). 35
however, hegel reminds us that this new era does not ‘come on the scene’ ready made, 
in its full actuality, but rather like a newborn child it comes in its ‘immediacy or its 
notion’. That is, this new world appears in time in its ‘principle’ or ‘simple Notion’ (Ps ¶ 
12), and this principle is freedom. Qua principle, freedom appears as a task to be real-
ized.36 Thus the french revolution’s proclamation of universal freedom, the ‘for all’, is a 
principle lacking embodiment. The living spirit of the collective expression of freedom 
misfired. Thus ‘the experience of what spirit is’ according to hegel ‘still lies ahead for 
consciousness’ and what it is that lies ahead, spirit or freedom actualized, is the ‘absolute 
substance which is the unity of the different independent self-consciousnesses which, 
in their opposition, enjoy perfect freedom and independence: “i” that is “We” and the 
“We” that is “i”’ (Ps ¶ 177). But this is to be expected, for as true principle spirit always 
comes on the scene in its self-loss. Both philosophically and politically speaking, free-
dom must claim itself as free, for if it were to simply ‘come on the scene’ ready-made it 
would not embody its own freedom freely. in this sense cognition of freedom is the prin-
ciple of the conceptual form, that is of philosophy, and the promise of the future located 
in the present as a task to be realized. Thus, according to hegel:
Through knowledge, spirit makes manifest a distinction between knowledge and 
that which is; this knowledge is thus what produces a new form of development. 
     35. it is interesting to compare this use of ‘flash’ with a miscellaneous note found in hegel’s hand: ‘The 
subsistence of the community is its continuous, eternal becoming, which is grounded in the fact that spirit is 
an eternal process of self-cognition, dividing itself into the finite flashes of light of individual consciousness, 
and then re-collecting and gathering itself up out of this finitude—inasmuch as it is in the finite conscious-
ness that the process of knowing spirit’s essence takes place and that the divine self-consciousness thus arises. 
out of the foaming ferment of finitude, spirit rises up fragrantly’ cited in georg Wilhelm friedrich hegel, 
Lectures on the Philosophy of  Religion, P. c. hodgson (ed.), trans. r. f. Brown, P. c. hodgson and J. M. stewart, 
vol. iii The consummate religion, 3 vols., Berkeley, university of california Press, 1998, p. 233 n191.
     36. see Toula nicolacopoulos and george vassilacopoulos, ‘Philosophy and revolution: Badiou’s infidel-
ity to the event’, Cosmos and History, vol. 2, no. 1-2, 2006, pp. 210-25, p. 370. in this article the authors read 
the whole of Western philosophy in these terms. Thus ‘[s]ince the greeks, western history can be under-
stood as the yet to be resolved tension between a world that produces the revolutionary idea of the gather-
ing “we” and at the same time constructs itself as the reality that denies the idea its actualization.’ 
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The new forms at first are only special modes of knowledge, and it is thus that a 
new Philosophy is produced: yet since, it already is a wider kind of spirit, it is the 
inward birth-place of the spirit which will later arrive at actual form. (lhP i 55)
This is the unique character and strength of spirit to survive the separation of its notion 
from its reality, that is to survive its own division and to create its freedom out of this di-
vision. hence the need of philosophy, spirit’s need, is to manifest itself out of its self-loss. 
for this reason formally the essence of spirit is freedom, the concept’s [(notion’s)] absolute 
negativity as identity with itself. in accordance with this formal determination, the 
spirit can abstract from everything external and form its own externality, from its 
very life; it can endure the negation of its individual immediacy, infinite pain, i.e. 
it can maintain itself affirmatively in this negativity and be identical for itself. This 
possibility is its intrinsic abstract universality, a universality that is for itself (ePM 
§ 382).37
if absolute negativity is the essential quality of spirit then we can see how spirit becomes 
spiritual, present to itself philosophically, out of the division of reality and its principle 
and thus how and why ‘[d]ichotomy is the source of the need of  philosophy’ (d 89)—
because ‘the appearance of the absolute has become isolated from the absolute and 
fixated into independence’ (d 89). What is important here is that the image of the whole 
becomes apparent through the dichotomy, hence ‘the appearance [of the absolute] can-
not disown its origin, and must aim to constitute the manifold of its limitations into one 
whole’ (d 89). however, the absolute is no night in which all cows are black, for ‘reason 
is [not] altogether opposed to opposition and limitation. for the necessary dichotomy 
is one factor in life[—union, being the other]’ (d 90-1). it is for this reason that hegel 
suggests that 
[w]hen the might of union vanishes from the life of men and the antitheses lose their 
living connection and reciprocity and gain independence, the need for philosophy 
arises. from this point of view the need is contingent. But with respect to the given 
dichotomy the need is the necessary attempt to suspend the rigidified opposition 
between subjectivity and objectivity; to comprehend the achieved existence (das 
Gewordensein) of the intellectual and real world as a becoming’ (d 91).
Therefore reason, as the infinite activity of becoming, creates a vision of the whole as 
united in its differentiation, and that in uniting what was rent asunder reason has ‘re-
duced the absolute dichotomy to a relative one, one that is conditioned by the original 
identity’ (d 91). as we can see, according to hegel the need of philosophy emerges when 
we experience the divisions of the modern world and that it is through this need that the 
whole, qua spirit, becomes clear for us in its alienated being. What needs stressing is that 
while the ‘dichotomy’ is situated within specific histories, cultures, and events, for phi-
losophy as such a more fundamental division is present. hegel argues that the separa-
tion of self and world, or subject and object, is in fact the condition for both philosophy 
     37. g. W. f. hegel, Philosophy of  Mind: Being Part Three of  the Encyclopaedia of  the Philosophical Sciences (1830), 
Together with the Zusätze, M. J. inwood (ed.), trans. William Wallace and a. v. Miller with revisions and 
commentary by M. J. inwood, oxford, oxford, 2007, (henceforth ePM).
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and of freedom understood philosophically. This is because for hegel, freedom makes 
itself felt philosophically, when a kind of reflective attitude that distances the knowing 
subject from its known object emerges (lPh i 24 & 94-6). in this sense the cartesian 
cogito and the Kantian turn to the subject, are radicalizations of an existing division that 
first emerges in the greek polis.38
hegel makes the point that the subjectivity of the ancient and modern philosopher 
is radically different. The ‘plasticity’ of the ancient self meant that ‘one’s philosophy 
determined one’s [life] situation. an individual could actually live as a philosopher, and 
this often happened; that is to say, one’s outward circumstances were determined in 
conformity with this purpose of one’s inner life’ (lhP 25-6 iii 109).39 however, ‘[i]n the 
modern times the relationship is different. Philosophers occupy no specific position in 
the state; they live in bourgeois circumstances or participate in public life, or in living 
their private lives they do so in such a way that their private status does not isolate them 
from other relationships’ (lhP 25-6 iii 109-10). in the modern world every person 
is absorbed into the powerful ‘universal nexus, based on the understanding’ and thus 
located in the fundamental division in which the ‘inner [world within ourselves] and 
outer [determined by an external order] can coexist as autonomous and independent’ 
(lhP 25-6 iii 110). That this outer order can be relegated to an external order, which is 
in this sense embodied, the philosopher literally lives the dichotomy through which the 
whole becomes visable, philosophically speaking. consequently, while hegel designates 
several ancient thinkers as ‘speculative’, genuinely speculative awareness is the aware-
ness inhabited by the modern. hegel recognizes that ‘speculative thinking consists in 
bringing the thoughts together, and they must be brought together—that is the whole 
point. The heart and true greatness of Platonic philosophy lies in it bringing-together 
things that in representation are distinct from one another (being and non-being, one 
and many, and so forth), so that we are not just passing over from one to the other’ 
(lhP 25-6 ii 202).40 however, the task of gathering for Plato was one thing, but for the 
modern philosophers, who exist in a more radicalized dispersal, it is altogether another 
thing and greater speculative strength is required.41
     38. on the relation of philosophizing to the greek polis see george vassilacopoulos, ‘Plato’s Republic and 
the end of Philosophy’, Philosophical Inquiry, vol. XiX, no. 1-2, 2007, pp. 34-45.
     39. georg Wilhelm friedrich hegel, Lectures on the History of  Philosophy: The Lectures of  1825-1826, trans. 
robert f. Brown, J. M. stewart and h. s. harris, vol. 3 Medieval and Modern Philosophy, Berkeley, 
university of california Press, 1990, (henceforth lhP 25-6 iii).
     40. g. W. f. hegel, Lectures on the History of  Philosophy 1825-6, robert f. Brown (ed.), trans. r. f. Brown 
and J. M. stewart with the assistance of h. s. harris, vol. 2 greek Philosophy, oxford, oxford, 2006, 
(henceforth lhP 25-6 ii).
     41. for an original and sensitive treatment of the power of the formal subject, a subject determined by the 
‘universal nexus based on the understanding’ see Toula nicolacopoulos, The Radical Critique of  Liberalism: In 
Memory of  a Vision, seddon, re.press, 2008, Toula nicolacopoulos and george vassilacopoulos, Hegel and the 
Logical Structure of  Love: An Essay on Sexualities, Family and the Law, aldershot, ashgate, 1999. 
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PhilosoPhy and TheMaTic ThinKing: TWo oBJecTions 
in taking account of the very force that activates the philosophical project we can 
see that for hegel the need of philosophy has two dimensions. on the one hand phi-
losophy needs, or is always retroactively related to, an event that provides the existential 
conditions or the ‘soil’ from which philosophy can grow (see Ps ¶ 26). on the other hand 
we can see that philosophy’s need is to give conceptual shape to that which is so it can 
be—that is to give conceptual form to that which will become ‘actual form’. in not taking 
account of, or treating merely thematically, the beginning before the beginning—and 
therefore philosophy as the conceptual dwelling space of revolution—many commenta-
tors miss the purpose of hegel’s philosophy. for example, in taking up the ‘we’ as a theme 
or a problem in hegel’s thinking, the very possibility of understanding it as the dwelling 
space of the philosopher opened up by the revolutionary is hidden. furthermore, given 
the relation articulated above between philosophy and the political, one may expect 
thinkers sympathetic to the future announced in the revolution—freedom expressed 
by and for all—to be more sympathetic, or at least sensitive, to hegel’s project as envi-
sioned in these terms. however, this is not the case. To be sure, some of the most notable 
examples of a thematic treatment of hegel’s thinking have come from those thinkers 
informed by the same revolutionary events as hegel.
This tendency can be found in the work of habermas who has in turn played a par-
adigmatic role, if often not specifically acknowledged, in shaping hegelian scholarship 
more generally. habermas sees hegel’s philosophy becoming problematic in at least two 
ways, both of which from his perspective lead ultimately into conservatism and thus fail 
to provide the desired or appropriate philosophical grounding for social change. That 
is, while recognizing that hegel is indeed the philosopher who first captures the revolu-
tionary spirit of modernity,42 habermas believes hegel ultimately does not and can not 
sustain this project. consequently habermas argues firstly, that in his early work hegel 
offers us a radical vision which he later abandons and secondly, that his philosophy 
relies on the absolute as unwarranted presupposition. While we are using habermas to 
engage hegel on these two points, they are in fact familiar criticisms that any number 
of thinkers both hostile and sympathetic to hegel would make.43 
however, consideration of these criticisms offered by habermas can potentially 
make explicit both the role that the relation between philosophy and the political play 
in the beginning and activation of philosophy for hegel, and the kind of justification an 
appropriately presuppositionless beginning requires for hegel’s philosophy to actually 
be philosophical. furthermore, it will hopefully become clear that by failing to see the 
appropriate relation between thought and its activation, habermas may not only fail to 
     42. recall that habermas understands and attributes the articulation of modernity—as that period that 
‘can and will no longer borrow the criteria by which it takes its orientation from models supplied by another 
epoch; it has to create its normativity out of  itself’—to hegel. consequently according to habermas ‘[m]odernity 
sees itself cast back upon itself without any escape’ habermas, The Philosophical Discourse of  Modernity, p. 7.
     43. a well argued example of an alternate reading of the ‘we’ that rejects the idea of the absolute as there 
with us from the beginning, a criticism also made by habermas, is offered by robert sinnerbrink in this 
volume.
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understand hegel’s project more broadly, but paradoxically find himself in the position 
in which his own philosophy can be seen to suffer the very fate that he ascribes to he-
gel’s. focusing exclusively on the external dimension of ‘the need of philosophy’—or on 
the need at this time for philosophy and what philosophy needs at this time in order to be reformed in 
contradistinction to philosophy’s own need at this time—habermas limits the possibilities for 
establishing an appropriate context to appreciate hegel’s philosophy in its own terms. 
What is more, the relevance of habermas’ criticisms of hegel’s system are further lim-
ited if one takes seriously what Hegel considers to be an appropriate context and begin-
ning for philosophical thinking. That is, these criticisms are only criticisms if one accepts 
the thematic approach to philosophy, because what habermas presents are criticisms 
of certain concepts thematically treated. Thus if the presence of the absolute (as with us 
from the beginning), and the speculative nature of hegel’s ‘political’ philosophy are un-
derstood speculatively, that is, in terms of the activation of philosophy and consequently 
in the context of the aforementioned revolution/philosophy relation—as opposed to 
habermas’ thematic treatment—, such critical readings can be seen to lack depth and 
sensitivity. 
Philosophy and the Political
in characterizing hegel’s Phenomenology as ‘half-hearted’44 habermas goes to the very 
core of his criticism of hegel, which is nothing less than a criticism of the very purpose 
of hegel’s philosophical project as overly idealistic. as stated earlier, hegel’s project 
is considered by habermas to be half-hearted or limited for two reasons.45 firstly, in 
presenting the view that would become dominant within Marxist criticism, habermas 
argues that hegel’s early pre-Phenomenological writings—in particular his Jena Philosophy 
of  Mind—’offered a distinctive, systemic basis for the formative process of the spirit, 
which he later abandoned’,46 in favour of a conservative philosophical system ‘which 
once more devoured the whole world into philosophy’.47 according to habermas in 
hegel’s early writings ‘it is not the spirit in the absolute movement of reflecting on itself 
which manifests itself in, among other things, language, labour, and moral relationships, 
but rather, it is the dialectical interconnections between linguistic symbolization, labour, 
     44. Jürgen habermas, Knowledge and Human Interests, trans. Jeremy J. shapiro, 2nd ed., london, heine-
mann, 1981, p. 10.
     45. This is not the extent of habermas’ critique of hegel, rather they are two criticisms that are relevant 
in terms of this discussion.
     46. Jürgen habermas, ‘labour and interaction: remarks on hegel’s Jena Philosophy of Mind’, Theory and 
Practice, trans. John viertel, Boston, Beacon Press, 1973, pp. 142-69, p. 142. While habermas is drawing on 
an already emergent trend within Marxism—most notable is perhaps the influence of lukács—to focus on 
the works of hegel that are seen to be still under the influence of his study of political economy, this essay 
of habermas’ in my view should be recognized as a decisive essay in the development of the understanding 
of hegel within the critical Marxist tradition. also see györgy lukács, The Young Hegel: Studies in the Relations 
Between Dialectics and Economics, london, Merlin Press, 1975.
     47. Jürgen habermas, ‘on hegel’s Political Writings’, Theory and Practice, trans. John viertel, Boston, Bea-
con Press, 1973, pp. 170-94, p. 194.
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and interaction which determine the concept of spirit’.48 here we see, in habermas’ 
eyes, hegel offering the beginnings of a philosophical discourse that will eventually be 
developed, by others, into a materialist critical theory and not the idealism of the later 
hegel. in this sense Marx is the genuine heir of the early hegel and it is he who, despite 
his own shortcomings,49 develops the so-called ‘radical’ dimension of hegel’s philosophy 
against hegel’s own reactionary systematization. 
however, the mode of critique offered above does not touch hegel. for example, 
when habermas makes the claim that spirit does not, or should not be understood to 
manifest itself in the world via ‘the absolute movement of reflecting on itself ’, but rather 
that we should understand material and social action as that ‘which determine[s] the 
concept of spirit’50 we could be tempted to agree with habermas, as revolution is surely 
a form of material and social action. however, such agreement from an hegelian per-
spective would be futile because this ‘view’ of habermas’ is formulated without consid-
eration of the philosophical element itself, it is a mode of critique developed without 
consideration of the emergence and activation of philosophical thinking as such—the 
event of speculative philosophy. from this perspective we should not understand the re-
lation between philosophy, the political (including the material conditions of a situation) 
and social change as a series of concepts that one formulates a philosophical position 
around, rather they should be understood as the very elements which are implicated 
within, or that become relevant through, the event of philosophy itself. That is, hegel 
did not decide that philosophy comes after the revolution, or that ‘change’ is a relevant 
topic of philosophy. rather in thinking or encountering the philosophical element as 
such, the relationship between thinking and change (and for that matter praxis), be-
comes apparent to the philosopher. What is relevant for philosophy is at the very least 
initially made relevant in and through thought itself. 
despite the importance that has been attached to these ideas here, it is important 
to note that there is nothing preventing the thinker from simply producing a philoso-
phy without consideration of the beginning before the beginning or the very event of 
philosophy itself. on the contrary, it seems natural enough to simply start thinking 
philosophical thoughts; that is, the world produces situations that strike us as relevant 
and we simply begin thinking about them in a philosophical manner, the ultimate goal 
of which is to produce a unique or useful perspective on the problem. however, be-
cause of the ease in which we can enter the philosophical process, it could be argued 
that the challenge for us today is not to think of something important or unique—our 
culture produces new thoughts all the time—rather the challenge for us as philosophers 
is to resist this path. What is required is that we try to encounter the very activity and 
activation of thinking itself, so as not to presuppose what is most essential to the philo-
sophical undertaking. More specifically speaking, it is not that we simply can just start 
thinking that is the problem, or even that we should resist this particular activity, rather 
     48. habermas, ‘labour and interaction’, p. 143.
     49. see habermas, ‘labour and interaction’, pp. 168-9.
     50. habermas, ‘labour and interaction’, p. 143.
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i want to suggest that when a thinker takes the activity of thinking for granted without 
considering the activation of this thinking, or at least gives up trying to account for it, 
their thinking becomes limited by this omission and consequently produces concepts 
shaped by that limitation. according to hegel, thinking that does not take account of 
itself remains reflective and consequently produces thoughts—regardless of what may 
be claimed by the thinker involved—that remain within the shape of ‘consciousness’ 
and thus informed by its dichotomous relation. When thought is shaped in ‘the way of 
consciousness’ the dichotomous relation between subject and object produces claims 
that are appropriate to empirical verification. That is, the claims produced either cor-
respond to reality, and are thus labeled ‘true’, or they do not. it is for this reason that 
a theory such as Marx’s can, on the one hand be disproved in time—as it has more or 
less been for habermas—in that it does not adequately correspond empirically to the 
world as it currently appears. While on the other hand such a theory relies on a rather 
voluntaristic element with regard to its transformation into praxis.51 hence, that Marx 
produces a theory of revolution and social change, is itself not necessarily related to the 
actual transformation of that theory into practice. 
despite habermas’ critique of Marx’s thought, he remains a part of the Marxist 
tradition in that his thinking is informed by the command that it is no longer adequate 
for philosophers to merely interpret the world—hegel is here of course envisioned as 
the paradigmatic case of an ‘interpreter’ in this sense—the point is to change it. despite 
the ‘attractiveness’ of a command such as this for the philosopher who wants to be 
revolutionary—or dwell in the revolutionary space opened up by hegel—any thought, 
regardless of the attractiveness of its ‘content’, produced by a mode of thinking that does 
not address the fundamental question of the activation of philosophy as such, remains 
relative to the givenness of its production as a thought. This could explain why we find 
ourselves today transfixed by the seemingly unanswerable question of how thought can 
relate to the world that it seeks to change and how the world, considered as a change-
able entity, relates to thought without thinking becoming thematic and voluntaristic. 
after all, this command is a pronouncement in, and is given shape through, philosophi-
cal thinking.
Thought of in this way, despite claims made to the contrary, it is not hegel that 
produces a philosophy that gives thought too radical a function, that of actually chang-
ing the world, but rather habermas and Marx. despite this, both philosophical ap-
proaches see the french revolution marking the birth of a new age, an age in which a 
radical form of freedom has been announced and will eventually be actualized—what 
philosophy has given conceptual form to will eventually become ‘actual form’. The differ-
ence is that for hegel the world will change to fully embrace the reality of freedom not 
because we can think how to change the world, as is the case for Marx and habermas, 
but because the event of speculative thinking expresses the changeability of the world 
itself. But if this is the case, then according to hegel, it follows that the world must have 
     51. it is important to note that habermas accepts that this is the case for his thinking, but would claim it 
as a reality for all thought.
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already changed in order for its changeability to be embraced by speculative philoso-
phy, and that philosophy as post-revolutionary can be understood as a recollection of this 
embracing. 
Absolute Knowledge as a Presupposition
according to hegel the cognitive perspective from which the philosopher recollects 
is absolute knowledge, a way of thinking that takes place within the unified perspective 
of the knowing and the known, a perspective that habermas does not accept hegel does 
or can achieve. Thus it is the character of absolute knowledge that forms the basis of the 
second sense in which habermas thinks that hegel’s philosophy is ‘half-hearted’. read-
ing absolute knowledge epistemologically, habermas argues that
there is something half-hearted about the Phenomenology of  Mind. The standpoint of 
absolute knowledge is to proceed with immanent necessity from phenomenological 
experience. But because it is absolute, it does not really need to be justified by 
the phenomenological self-reflection of mind; and strictly speaking it is not even 
capable of such justification.52
habermas suggests that ‘from the very beginning hegel presumes as given a knowl-
edge of the absolute’53 a presupposition that, regardless of hegel’s critique of (Kantian) 
knowledge as such, would have to in turn presuppose such a critique because ‘the pos-
sibility of just this knowledge [of the absolute] would have to be demonstrated accord-
ing to the criteria of a radicalized critique of knowledge’.54 however, it could be argued 
that in epistemologizing the absolute, habermas fails to understand the role it plays 
in hegel’s system. in this way habermas produces a reflective response to absolute 
knowledge—the cognitive perspective of the ‘we’—in much the same as other com-
mentators55 in that he thinks of absolute knowledge thematically as something that can 
be ‘known’ epistemologically rather than as the ontologically constituted dwelling space 
of the revolutionary thinker. This is why the absolute is with us from the beginning; not 
because we know something in the way consciousness knows it, but rather that we know 
it in being claimed by what is, thus philosophy becomes a recollection.
given this, what requires justification philosophically speaking in hegel’s work is 
that which is scientific—that is, the two scientific systems: the Phenomenology and the Ency-
clopaedic System including the Science of  Logic—but not the pre-systemic beginning before 
the beginning, or the activation of philosophy as such. Justification and necessity—the 
demands that make a thinking scientific in the hegelian sense—only become necessary 
or in need of justification themselves within philosophy itself, or rather it is the philo-
sophical process itself that makes justification and necessity an issue for thinking in the 
first place. The activation of the philosophical project cannot have necessity itself or it 
     52. habermas, Knowledge and Human Interests, p. 10.
     53. habermas, Knowledge and Human Interests, p. 10.
     54. habermas, Knowledge and Human Interests, p. 10.
     55. for a brief account of harris’ objection to the absolute as being with us from the beginning see h. s. 
harris, Hegel: Phenomenology and System, indianapolis, hackett, 1995, pp. 13-4.
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would already presuppose the philosophical. 
Thus the kind of objections made by habermas are pre-empted by hegel in the 
preface to the Phenomenology and also more explicitly in the Difference essay when hegel 
recognizes that ‘[o]ne may require of propositions that they be justified. But the justi-
fication of these propositions as presuppositions is still not supposed to be philosophy 
itself, so that the founding and grounding gets going before, and outside of, philosophy’ 
(d 94). Thus philosophy needs to be ‘furnished with some sort of vestibule’ and this is 
why, as  has been suggested above, that ‘[t]he need of philosophy can be called the pre-
supposition of philosophy’ (d 93). But this ‘presupposition’ is nothing other than the ‘need 
that has come to utterance’ (d 93). accordingly hegel suggests that the presupposition 
of philosophy, the uttered need, is thus the need ‘posited for reflection’ and that because 
of the very nature of reflection ‘there must [in fact] be two presuppositions’ (d 93). The 
first presupposition is ‘the absolute itself ’56 that according to hegel ‘is already present’—
’how otherwise could it be sought?’—whereas the second presupposition is associated 
with the philosopher, in that consciousness must have ‘stepped out of the totality, that 
is, it may be taken to be the split into being and not-being, concept and being, finitude 
and infinity’ (d93). Therefore while the absolute must be there with us from the begin-
ning, from the fixed determinate standpoint of the dichotomy ‘the absolute synthesis is 
a beyond, it is the undetermined and the shapeless’ (d 93). This is why the philosopher, 
while dwelling in the already present absolute, begins as the dichotomous figure of con-
sciousness. 
it follows from this that ‘the task of philosophy consists in uniting these presupposi-
tions: to posit being in non-being, as becoming; to posit dichotomy in the absolute, as 
its appearance; to posit the finite in the infinite, as life’ (d 93-4). at this point it is worth 
recalling hegel’s warning against thinking of ‘the need’ as itself reflective when he makes 
the point that this kind of language ‘is clumsy … for the need acquires in this way a re-
flective form’ (d 94) that it does not actually have. What is difficult to understand here, 
but nonetheless underlies the whole of hegel’s thinking and our ability to understand 
the formation and movement of this thought, is the role of the knowing/being mutual 
informing. readings of hegel’s philosophy, like habermas’, that characterize it as overly 
subjective or hypostatize the absolute57 tend to under-emphasize the speculative inter-
relation of being and knowing. hegel is quite explicit on this mutual informing when 
he says that:
reason is the truth that is in and for itself, and is the simple identity of the subjectivity 
of the concept with its objectivity and universality. The universality of reason, 
therefore signifies the object, which in consciousness qua consciousness was only 
given, but is now itself universal, permeating and encompassing the i. equally it 
signifies the pure I, the pure form overarching the object and encompassing it 
within itself (ePM § 438). 
     56. ‘reason produces [the absolute], merely by freeing conscious from its limitations. This suspension of 
the limitations is conditioned by the presupposed unlimitedness’ (d 93).
     57. charles Taylor’s influential work is also a notable inclusion in this way of thinking. see charles Taylor, 
Hegel, cambridge, cambridge university Press, 1978.
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consequently the so-called unjustified beginning is not the problem it may seem 
to be, as hegel’s philosophy is concerned with what is. Philosophy is activated and sets 
to work precisely in anticipation of its goal, or in the terms we have outlined here, it 
sets to work giving conceptual form to that which has already been announced. This 
is because the hegelian philosopher encounters the principle of freedom via the force 
of the revolutionary claims of the era, and the subsequent retreat of these claims from 
the life-world of the philosopher. Therefore the requirement for the hegelian philoso-
pher to justify the existence of their object, in this case the manifesting absolute, does 
not take the same form as the requirement attendant to formal modes of thinking and 
the thinkers of these modes. Because there is a mutual informing of being and knowing 
for the speculative philosopher, the lack of externality—an externality to the knowing 
being relation that is absolute—means that justification takes on a different form than 
it does for the empiricist, metaphysician or critical thinker whom, according to hegel, 
presupposes the givenness of their object which includes their mode of cognition and its 
advance (see el § 1). This need for justification is determined by the very givenness that 
is the source of the original demand. seen in this light the central concern is not to make 
sense of the absolute per se, but rather that one must allow themselves to be captured by 
the claim of freedom and claim this claiming as their own. What would be required here 
from the hegelian perspective is not an epistemological58 engagement with the being 
of the absolute, but rather a dwelling within it as already claimed by the revolutionary 
spirit of freedom. This does not mean that there is no justification required and that the 
philosophical enterprise becomes a kind of mystical experience, rather that the kind of 
justification that needs to take place, a justification that hegel believes he performs in 
his Phenomenology, is of a wholly different order than what is expected by contemporary 
philosophical discourse. in this sense hegel’s philosophy is of another time. To be sure, 
the certainty of this anticipation and activation is only known as justifiably true ‘by exposi-
tion of the system itself ’ (Ps ¶ 17).
if we compare the introduction to hegel’s first published work, the Difference essay, to 
the ‘Preface’ in the Phenomenology—two works that span the time that habermas consid-
ers to be hegel’s more radical period—we can see a striking continuity between the two. 
To be sure, the similarity relates particularly to hegel’s discussion of the claims and aims 
of philosophizing itself which seem to be the disputed territory for habermas. given 
this it is reasonable to ask, despite the subtlety and depth of his analysis, why habermas 
chooses to focus on unpublished and incomplete lecture manuscripts to simply find 
what must be considered rather common place insights. The fact that Hegel made these 
observations in the context of spirit/world relations—regardless of the veracity, or lack 
thereof, of such a way of thinking—seems to lack any kind of necessity for habermas 
and indeed adds little to the overall nature of the observations or insights garnered. for 
has not Marx, as habermas actually claims, not said much the same things but more 
poignantly? if these insights extracted from hegel lack what habermas acknowledges is 
     58. according to habermas ‘hegel replaced the enterprise of epistemology with the phenomenological 
self-reflection of mind [spirit]’ habermas, Knowledge and Human Interests, p. 7.
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what Hegel sees as most fundamental, what does hegel offer us here? in turning hegel 
‘the right way up’ does habermas not invite us to see in hegel what can be seen in just 
about any thinker of the post-hegelian period? 
it seems that in the criticism of hegel as a political conservative habermas wants 
hegel to be Marx, and in the criticism of hegel as dogmatically presupposing the ab-
solute, he wants hegel to be Kant. however, hegel is neither of these thinkers and if 
we want to encounter hegel as hegel—to be kindred with him—we need to meet him 
somewhere. in the remainder of this essay consideration will be given to the question of 
what would be involved in encountering hegel as hegel and what the conditions of the 
activation of hegelian philosophy are according to this encounter. Thus if the issues that 
have been raised so far have validity, and if certain aporias remain within thinking, then 
the following questions become relevant for us: how do we take up hegel?; where do 
we meet hegel philosophically?; and how is hegelian philosophy activated in this light? 
however, these questions have an added dimension: it would be fair to ask why we are 
not all hegelian philosophers already, for didn’t the french revolution as the soil of phi-
losophy announce freedom universally ‘for all’? if our ‘interest’ and ‘want’ in philosophy 
comes from our historical claiming as free subjects, why do we not all philosophize qua 
hegelian? To be sure, as we know, we are certainly not all hegelian philosophers; hence 
the tendency in the literature to identify ‘we’ philosophers with an elite that knows. 
But why and how does one find themselves within the ‘we’, and what must one think 
to be a philosopher as opposed to a political theorist, a free market entrepreneur or a 
researcher? Where must our interest lie? To be more explicit, if the commentaries and 
critiques of hegel outlined above miss what is most fundamental in hegel when they 
approach his thought ‘thematically’, then the question of how one encounters hegel’s 
thought non-thematically arises. 
ThinKing The ThoughT ThaT gives rise To PhilosoPhy
at the beginning of the third part of his lecture series on nietzsche59 heidegger 
claims that we will only know who nietzsche ‘is and above all who he will be’ when we 
are able to think the thought that gave shape to the phrase ‘the will to power’.60 heide-
gger goes on to say that we will never experience who nietzsche is by an examination of 
his life history, as a historical figure, a personality or a psychological object; furthermore, 
we are even unable to encounter nietzsche as a thinker through a presentation of his 
writings. in this sense, for heidegger it is this one single thought that destines nietzsche 
to be an ‘essential thinker’ as opposed to a mere ‘writer’ or ‘researcher’ who may have 
     59. Martin heidegger, Nietzsche: Vol. III: The Will to Power as Knowledge and as Metaphysics & Vol. IV: Nihilism, 
david farrell Krell (ed.), trans. Joan stambaugh, david farrell Krell and frank a. capuzzi, vol. 3 & 4, 4 
vols., san francisco, harpersanfrancisco, 1991, p. 3ff.
     60. heidegger links nietzsche’s thought of ‘the will to power’ with his standing as the last metaphysician. 
notwithstanding heidegger’s reading of the history of metaphysics and hegel as the most radical, and thus 
the most metaphysical of metaphysicians, heidegger’s account of the encounter with a thinker is instruc-
tive.
Paul ashTon 347
many thoughts; for who nietzsche really is can only be understood as the one ‘that trod 
the path of the thought’ that led to the saying ‘the will to power’. following heidegger’s 
approach we might then ask what then is, or should we understand as, hegel’s one great 
thought, assuming that he is what heidegger would describe as an ‘essential thinker’? 
This question appears to be extremely difficult to answer when one considers the 
sheer depth and scope of hegel’s field of inquiry. for many, this one great thought would 
lie in his political philosophy, the field that has the most general appeal in the system, for 
others it would lie in his bringing forth of history as a key philosophical discipline. Per-
haps the only facet of hegel’s philosophical system that most agree his defining moment 
would not occur in is his Philosophy of  Nature,61 however, even this much-maligned aspect 
of the system has its supporters these days. it seems that hegel’s philosophy contains an 
almost unlimited number of ‘insights’ that have shaped thinking in the proceeding cen-
turies; no philosophy of the nineteenth or twentieth century stands apart from hegel’s 
thinking, untouched by its scope. 
it seems reasonable that the one guiding thought, if it is indeed to be the one singular 
thought, should treat a thinker’s thinking as a whole, that it should be a thought that 
unifies that thinking, and that it should single that particular thinker out from all other 
thinkers. however, one thought that does not separate hegel from other truly great 
thinkers, but may nonetheless help us in our enquiry, is hegel’s belief that his philosophy 
is the last philosophical system and that with him philosophy has come to an end. if we take 
hegel’s self-understanding of his philosophy in relation to all others seriously, then we 
might expect to find some insight to our question in the conclusion to his Lectures on the 
History of  Philosophy. understood in hegel’s terms, the Lectures can be considered as the 
autobiography of philosophy itself. The ‘final result’ of this autobiographical account of 
philosophy culminates with the conclusion that:
The ultimate aim and business of philosophy is to reconcile thought or the notion 
with reality [...] The result is the thought which is at home with itself, and at the 
same time embraces the universe therein, and transforms it into an intelligent 
world [... This a]bsolute, pure, infinite form is expressed as self-consciousness, the 
ego. This is the light that breaks forth on spiritual substance, and shows absolute 
content and absolute form to be identical;—substance is in itself identical with 
knowledge […] i.e. it recognizes pure Thought or Being as self-identity (lhP iii 
545-6 & 550).62
in understanding his thought in this way hegel claims his philosophy as the culmi-
nation of the ‘only one Philosophy’ embodying the ‘one principle’ (lhP iii 552), and 
thus draws the strong link between his thinking and that of the ancients in that ‘[t]he 
philosophy of the ancients had the absolute idea as its thought’ (lhP iii 548), and that 
‘aristotle was the first to say that voûs is the thought of thought’ (lhP iii 546), or even 
     61. g. W. f. hegel, Philosophy of  Nature: Being Part Two of  the Encyclopaedia of  the Philosophical Sciences, 1830, 
trans. M. J. Petry, 3 vols., london, george allen & unwin, 1970.
     62. g. W. f. hegel, Lectures on the History of  Philosophy, trans. e. s. haldane and frances h. simson, vol. iii 
Medieval and Modern Philosophy, 3 vols., lincoln, university of nebraska Press, 1995, (henceforth lhP 
iii).
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more explicitly when he approvingly quotes Parmenides:
Thought, and that on account of which thought is, are the same. for not without 
that which is, in which it expresses itself (έν ώ πεΦατισμένον έστίν), wilt thou find 
Thought, seeing that it is nothing and will be nothing outside of that which it is 
(lhP i 253) . 
hegel recognizes that Parmenides’ essential claim is that ‘Thought produces itself, and 
what is produced is thought. Thought is thus identical with Being, for there is nothing 
besides Being, this great affirmation’ (lhP i 253) and that this is the point of the tradi-
tion as a whole. hegel’s one great thought, the thought that he thinks brings the whole 
of philosophy to a close—the thought that ‘reconcile[s] thought or the notion with 
reality’—is not his thought at all but a thought that comes from the very beginnings 
of philosophy. Thus we find ourselves in a paradoxical situation, if we try to think the 
thought that gave rise to hegel’s one great thought we find ourselves in the situation of 
thinking the thought that leads to the saying that I have no new thoughts. What is more, 
we can understand as hegel himself does, that his philosophy offers us nothing new in a 
more general sense; that is, even if we take a thematic approach we can see that hegel 
does not offer any new or truly original insights: the absolute, the dialectic, speculative 
thinking, recognition, the unity of unity and difference, these have all been thought 
by others prior to hegel. as frederick Beiser points out there ‘is not a single hegelian 
theme that cannot be traced back to his predecessors in Jena’.63 how then do we think 
the thought that makes hegel a genuine and unique thinker if that thought is indeed 
that I have no new thoughts? furthermore, how can this be the case when we know that 
hegel is perhaps one of the most original, radical and fundamental of thinkers? What 
does it mean for a fundamental thinker to say i have no new thoughts?
What is easily missed if we follow this investigative approach is that hegel does not 
offer any specific theme or content of thought that we can identify as unique or original 
but rather that the thought of the essential unity of thought and being comes to itself in his 
thought. hegel claims that philosophy becomes conscious of itself as the world’s princi-
ple in his thought; that philosophy has become self-conscious and thus has finally realized 
itself as genuine Science, offering us a new form of thinking, absolute knowledge.64 accord-
ing to hegel speculative philosophy thinks the world as embodying its own principle, 
but it is only as scientific that philosophy ‘knows itself as absolute spirit’ (lhP iii 552). 
if we take seriously heidegger’s claim that what is important for us is not so much to 
     63. frederick c. Beiser, German Idealism: The Struggle Against Subjectivism, 1781-1801, cambridge, harvard 
university Press, 2002, p. 10. however, Beiser, erroneously in my view, also suggests that hegel was wilful 
in his expropriation of ideas in that he claimed them as his own. if anything Beiser is underplaying hegel’s 
sense of his own philosophy. he did not need to erroneously ‘exaggerate’ his own ‘originality’ because he 
saw himself as the one who consummated these ideas or made them philosophical.
     64. recall that in hegel’s usage ‘science’ refers to genuinely self-determining philosophy that forms itself 
as a system. Philosophy is no longer merely philosophy in the work of hegel, that is ‘the love of knowing’, as 
knowing is no longer external to its being, it has become ‘actual knowing’ (Ps ¶ 5). it is true, as we have said, 
that others claim the form of the speculative, for example schelling, but his grasp of the speculative from 
the hegelian point of view remains rather intuitive, a point borne out by his continual retreat to the sensual 
(art) and the theological (religion).
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think or even identify the essential thought of a thinker—in nietzsche’s case ‘the will to 
power’—but rather to think the thought that gave shape to the phrase, then we can see 
in the case of hegel rather than capturing the phrase ‘absolute knowledge’ or even to 
think the ‘unity of thought and being’, we need to ‘[tread] the path of thought’ as such. 
But what would be involved in treading the path of this thought? and if hegel’s philoso-
phy is the philosophy that offers us no new thoughts, what would it mean to tread the 
trodden path anew without stepping in the footsteps that muddy the ground? What is 
implicit in heidegger’s reflection on nietzsche becomes relevant to our argument here 
when he states that what is essential for us, as would-be philosophers, is not a matter 
of one’s ability to identify the thought, but rather it is our willingness to walk the path; to 
think the thought that gives rise to the thought. in hegel’s terms we can understand this 
willingness as the willingness to dwell in absolute knowledge.65 absolute knowledge is 
not the thought but the trodden path, that through hegel we can see as the path of all 
true philosophical thinking. What then makes hegel an essential thinker for us is not a 
thought but that he exposes to us the dwelling place where we, as philosophers, already 
dwell. 
hegel offers us nothing new in terms of determinate ideas to base our philosophical 
(or political) project on, but rather shows us the context in which ideas are activated and 
the dwelling space in which conceptual form is given to the future. This allows us to 
understand that it is the ‘willingness’ or the ‘want’ of the would-be philosopher to dwell 
in this space that is important, rather than a cognitively achieved height. What has to be 
noticed is that this space in which the philosopher dwells is the ‘we’ itself. understood in 
terms of the philosopher that expresses his or her willingness to embrace the announce-
ment of their freedom by giving conceptual form to it, the ‘we’ takes on an ontological 
dimension. This is in contradistinction to the predominantly epistemological reading 
that characterizes the ‘we’ in terms of the cognitive capacity of the philosopher. This is 
why science needs to ‘provide [the philosopher] with the ladder to this standpoint [of sci-
ence, and why it] should show him this standpoint within himself ’ (Ps ¶ 26). if absolute 
knowledge, as the dwelling place of the philosopher, is understood epistemologically, 
such a ladder would be superfluous, as habermas and others have argued. 
This analysis of the willingness of the would-be philosopher to activate themselves 
into the philosophical project and dwell with hegel in the ‘we’ is given account by hegel 
in the preface to his Phenomenology in the following way: ‘Pure self-recognition in absolute 
otherness, this aether as such, is the ground and soil of science or knowledge in general. The 
beginning of philosophy presupposes or requires that consciousness should dwell in this 
     65. in light of the criticism made earlier that habermas’ and Marx’s social theory tends toward ‘volunta-
rism’, the use of a term like ‘willingness’ with relation to hegel’s philosophy needs defending. The ‘willing-
ness’ of the would-be philosopher discussed in the text above does not introduce a voluntaristic element in 
the way that i have suggest one potentially exists in habermas’ and Marx’s thinking, because for hegel the 
philosopher always arrives too late—that philosophy is always a recollection—and thus the willingness of 
the individual to raise themselves into the aether and dwell philosophically primarily impacts on their own 
posture as a thinker and not their freedom as theorized. according to hegel philosophical thinking does not 
involve itself in politics in this sense, as it does not issue instructions on how the world ought to be.
cosMos and hisTory350
element’ (Ps ¶ 26). however, given that this pure self-recognition is ‘pure spirituality as the 
universal that has the form of simple immediacy’ then this beginning before the begin-
ning, ‘achieves its own perfection and transparency only through the movement of its 
becoming’ (Ps ¶ 26) which is the movement found firstly in the body of the Phenomenol-
ogy itself. That is, in ‘order to be able to live—and [actually] to live—with science and 
in science’ the would-be philosopher must ‘have raised itself into this aether’ (Ps ¶ 26) 
before he or she can think scientifically.
What is important to recognize here is that the individual qua philosopher can sur-
vive in this aether and is thus appropriate to it—recall that science must show ‘this 
standpoint within himself ’—because ‘the individual is the absolute form [… or] uncon-
ditioned being’ (Ps ¶ 26). The philosopher raised into the aether is appropriate to the 
task of giving conceptual form to what has been announced in the revolution because, 
just as with science that knows that the ‘situation in which consciousness knows itself to 
be at home is […] one marked by the absence of spirit’ (Ps ¶ 26), so too does the revo-
lutionary spirit propelled to philosophy know that the world as it was before the revolu-
tion is equally marked by an absence of spirit, the world as it was is no longer habitable. 
however, the revolution has not fully actualized itself in the world as achieved principle 
and thus it remains a task for science to show ‘that and how this [spiritual] element 
belongs to it’ (Ps ¶ 26). That is, emerging immanently to the political situation of the 
world itself, out of ‘division’, so to speak, ‘science lack[s] this actual dimension, it is only 
the content as the in-itself, the purpose that is as yet still something inward, not yet spirit, 
but only spiritual substance. This in-itself has to express itself outwardly and become 
for-itself, and this means simply that it has to posit self-consciousness as one with itself ’ 
(Ps ¶ 26). however, this account assumes a willingness on the part of the philosopher to 
dwell in science; but what is the condition of this willingness, what does it mean to be 
willing in this sense?
The Kindred Spirit 
in the Difference essay, which we have already identified as a very important text, 
hegel gives an explicit account of the conditions under which an appropriate encounter 
with philosophy must take: ‘The living spirit that dwells in a philosophy demands to be 
born of a kindred spirit if it is to unveil itself ’ (d 86). The living spirit, understood in 
this way, ‘brushes past the historical concern which is moved by some interest’, past the 
‘curious collector of information’ and the discoverer of ‘alien phenomenon’ who are not 
concerned to ‘reveal [their] own inwardness’—’spirit itself slipped away between [their] 
fingers’—and seeks that space where ‘there is truth to be had’ (d 86). These inferior 
modes of thinking that hegel associates with the understanding—the thinking of con-
sciousness situated in the subject/object dichotomy—fail to capture the living spirit the 
way speculative philosophy does. 
To be kindred one must be both ‘kin’ and ‘re-d’: To be hegel’s kin we must be related, 
familiar, to be part of his family. But this does not mean that we go along blindly with 
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hegel, rather to be a member of a family is to be a member of a collective that dwells 
together. We must dwell together with hegel. To be ‘re-d’, as with ‘kin’, means to share 
the same blood, but re-d also means ‘again’, ‘to return to’ or ‘go back’—stop—to hegel, 
but it also means to ‘come after’, albeit in terms of, or in opposition to; red is dangerous, 
forbidden and urgent and finally red is revolution. accordingly to be kindred with he-
gel we must open ourselves to return again to hegel in order to dwell in the dangerous 
space of thought so as to conceptualize the world according to its principle.
one of course cannot merely be kindred with hegel, we must, like hegel himself, 
be kindred with the living spirit, for hegel only exists for us as, and in, the living spirit. 
our encounter with hegel qua philosopher is nothing more than an invitation to dwell 
in the dwelling place of the philosophers for it is through this encounter that the living 
spirit becomes explicit. Thus, if we must dwell in the dwelling place of philosophers in 
order to be philosophical then hegel’s Phenomenology and System become a secondary 
concern of ours as would-be philosophers. not secondary in the sense of unimportant, 
rather secondary in that it is only when one has claimed, or rather has been claimed by, 
the revolutionary spirit, and activated themselves as a philosopher, that these systematic 
texts, the architecture of the philosophical, becomes comprehensible to us. We must first 
raise ourselves into the house of the philosophers, we must learn to dwell philosophically 
first. To be kindred requires that we willingly claim the revolutionary nature of the liv-
ing spirit and be committed to dwelling in the claim. a ‘claim’ is also, of course, a dwell-
ing space itself, but not an unoccupied one, rather it is a place where one ‘stakes a claim’, 
and through, which one gains a right or ‘title’, in this case the right to philosophy.66 
concluding reMarKs: The Tragedy of hegelian ThinKing
if what has been said has value it could be argued that the singular thing that makes 
hegel an essential thinker is that he creates the space for us to dwell philosophically and 
provides a ladder into this science. it is for this reason that, with foucault, it is not so 
easy to ‘escape hegel’67 because in escaping hegel it is not his ideas or insights that need 
overturning or escaping, but the very dwelling space of the philosopher. Thus the con-
sequence of escaping hegel is to return from the inverted world to the everyday given 
world, to become a reflective collector of information (d 86), to become a writer or 
researcher. nonetheless, people fail to understand the extent to which, ‘crushed before 
     66. When one stakes a claim in the already claimed dwelling space the history and the occupants of the 
claim become relevant for the claimant. it is for this reason that one cannot honestly claim the title of phi-
losopher without acknowledging and living with those already dwelling in the claim. 
     67. Michel foucault, The Archaeology of  Knowledge and the Discourse on Language, trans. a.M. sheridan smith 
and rupert sawyer, new york, Pantheon, 1972, p. 235. ‘But truly to escape hegel involves an exact ap-
preciation of the price we have to pay to detach ourselves from him. it assumes that we are aware of the 
extent to which hegel, insidiously perhaps, is close to us; it implies a knowledge, in that which permits us 
to think against hegel, of that which remains hegelian. We have to determine the extent to which our 
anti-hegelianism is possibly one of his tricks directed against us, at the end of which he stands, motionless, 
waiting for us.’
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[…] the immensity of the claims made by the human spirit’ (lhP ii 10),68 today we have 
managed to escape, or rather have denied the hegelian moment within ourselves. This 
can be seen in the triumph of the ‘intellect’ over ‘reason’, of the special sciences (includ-
ing the social and natural sciences and the formal thinking of analytic philosophy) over 
speculative philosophy, unfreedom over freedom and the dominance of instrumental 
thinking, all of which render this abundantly clear. Thus revolution, as a claiming of the 
‘for all’, does not have the power or strength to claim everyone because we are so firmly 
‘at home in consciousness’ and the willingness to leave that which we know so well is 
not there for us in the way it is for thinkers like hegel.69 for thinkers today it is both dif-
ficult to find the strength required to be kindred with hegel, and the claiming that we 
claim—and claims us—similarly seems to lack the strength to capture us. Thus the task 
for those of us who are interested and willing to reencounter hegel, to be kindred with 
him, and through him encounter the philosophical as such—that is to give conceptual 
form to the future—is the path of despair and violence, because it is a path that inverts 
our world.70 
however, philosophers are always of their time, and our time, being a time of dark-
     68. g. W. f. hegel, Lectures on the History of  Philosophy, trans. e. s. haldane and frances h. simson, vol. ii 
Plato and the Platonists, 3 vols., lincoln, university of nebraska Press, 1995, (henceforth lhP ii).
     69. now is not the time to defend this claim, despite this, if hegel’s philosophy is to be comprehensive in 
the way that is being suggested, it must be able to account for the development of thinking after 1830 and 
consequently the seeming demise of the hegelian system. a defence which i believe can be made.
     70. hegel cautions us against thinking that our lack of strength to enter philosophy is related to the obscure 
or difficulty of its language. This is a criticism regularly made of hegel’s philosophy. however, this attitude 
totally misses the point of why philosophy is difficult. hegel explains why his thinking is obscure or difficult 
via heraclitus: ‘The obscurity in the philosophy of heraclitus lies essentially in the fact that it expresses a 
profoundly speculative thought, which is always obscure for the understanding. The concept of the idea is 
in conflict with the understanding and cannot be grasped by it’ (lhP 25-6 ii 73). in other words only by 
dwelling in absolute knowledge, by being inverted, can we make sense of that which appears obscure.
according to hegel the only reason that Plato is not labelled obscure as heraclitus, is because people 
generally fail to see the truly speculative nature of his writing. hegel argues that the ‘mythic form of the 
Platonic dialogues makes […] them the source of misunderstandings’ (lhP 25-6 ii 182), that is, there is a 
tendency in the Plato scholarship to miss the philosophical dimension of Plato’s thought. There is a failure to 
differentiate Plato’s words that operate ‘wholly in the representational mode’ (lhP 25-6 ii 183), from his 
philosophical thought. hegel makes mention of some well worn common misunderstandings such as when 
in the Meno (81c-d) and Phaedo (72e-7a) Plato talks of the existence of the human soul before a person’s birth: 
‘But that cannot be found in Plato’s philosophy’ even though it is ‘what Plato’s text literally says’ (lhP 25-6 
ii 183). To be sure for hegel in Plato’s philosophy ‘the spiritual element belongs to thinking’ (lhP 25-6 ii 
176), thus when Plato ‘speaks of the ideas as a cardinal point, and they are in fact the cardinal point of his 
philosophy. he speaks of them as independent [selbständig], which makes it easy to go on to portray them 
in the manner of the modern philosophy of the understanding, as separate actualities, as substances, as 
daemons or as angels; whereas they were indeed more in the nature of philosophical views [Ansichten]’ (lhP 
25-6 ii 183). 
it is the ‘greek science’, presented by Plato and aristotle, ‘where objective thought shapes itself into a 
whole. Plato’s thought is pure but concrete—it is the idea or thought, but the thought is inwardly self-deter-
mining’ (lhP 25-6 ii 14). yet for hegel, Plato’s thought remains in abstraction as the ‘idea only in its form 
of its universality’, and it is not until aristotle that thought becomes active, ‘that is self-determining through 
activity’ (lhP 25-6 ii 14). if what i am suggesting has value the activity that comes to philosophy with aris-
totle’s thought becomes essential to the development and initiation of thought in the modern period.
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ness, hides from us our ability to occupy or fully dwell in the dwelling space that hegel 
has attempted to make explicit through his philosophy—what seemed so apparent to 
the thinkers in the period after the french revolution is now less so. The philosopher 
today finds him or herself tragically caught in a shadow cast from the future, caught be-
tween the existing empirical world and the speculative beyond of absolute knowledge.71 
That we cannot easily dwell with hegel is apparent to all those who try to encounter 
him philosophically. one possible explanation for this is that the subject of address for 
great philosophers is the subject of the future, in some sense the speculative philosopher 
is from the future, is a human that has realized their ‘nature’ in the ‘achieved community 
of minds’ (Ps ¶ 69), a person who holds thoughts appropriate to another age. That the 
place in which we encounter hegel is one of a future cut-off from our empirical every-
day being, renders that encounter tragic. in this way we can understand our present 
being as would-be philosophers, as existing in the shadows of the spirits of the future. 
however, the business of philosophy is what is, not what ought to be. But this is no prob-
lem for hegel because spirit as absolute negativity comes on the scene in its simple no-
tion or its principle, it anticipates its actualization as its goal, an actualization that is in 
the future. To be sure, what is, is a shadow cast from the future; hegel’s recollection is a 
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